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Abstract: Kurt Gödel argues in “Russell’s Mathematical Logic” that on the as-
sumption that, contrary to Russell, definite descriptions are terms, it follows
given only several “apparently obvious axioms” that “all true sentences have the
same signification (as well as all false ones).” Stephen Neale has written that this
argument, and others by Church, Davidson, and Quine to similar conclusions,
are of considerable philosophical interest. Graham Oppy, responding to this
opinion, says they are of minimal interest. Falling between these is my opinion
that implications of these arguments for propositions and facts are of moderate
philosophical interest, and that these arguments provide occasions for reflection
of possible interest on fine lines of several theories of definite descriptions and
class–abstractions.
0 
0.1    
“A collapsing argument is an argument designed to show that there
are fewer items of a given kind than might be supposed. Alonzo
Church. . . , W. V. Quine. . . , and Donald Davidson. . . have used col-
lapsing arguments to undermine several philosophical theses, most
notable (i). . . that there are facts to which true sentences corre-
spond, (ii). . . that sentences designate propositions. . . ” (Neale 1995,
p. 761 (cf., 2001, p. 9).) “(T)here is a collapsing argument, says
Davidson, that precludes the articulation of (a viable theory of
facts). The style of argument—used earlier by Church and Quine—
is sometimes called the ‘Frege Argument’. . . In deference to the
minimal machinery and presuppositions of the argument, Barwise
and Perry . . . have dubbed it. . . the ‘slingshot.’ In view of the diffi-
culty involved in attributing the argument to Frege, I shall use this
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label . . . .(and) reflect carefully upon. . . an elegant slingshot proof
suggested by Gödel” (1995., pp. 763–4).
0.2    
Kurt Gödel writes that the assumption that definite descriptions terms to-
gether with certain “apparently obvious axioms. . . (leads) almost inevitably to
the conclusion that all true sentences have the same signification (as well as
all the false ones)” (Gödel 1944, pp. 128–9). According to Stephen Neale (1995,
1997, and 2001) the argument sketched by Gödel and related arguments due to
Church, Davidson, and Quine are of considerable philosophical interest. Gra-
ham Oppy (1997 and 2004) thinks they are of minimal interest. I think these
arguments are of moderate interest for theories of propositions, showing, as they
do, that, if one would have, for sentences to express, more than two proposi-
tions, or at least more than two classes of logically equivalent propositions,
and, if one counts definite descriptions, or at least certain definite descriptions
of classes (a.k.a, ‘class–abstractions’), as terms, then
one cannot endorse certain propositional–identity (or positional–
equivalence) conditions such as that propositions that ‘say the same things
about the same things’ are identical (or logically equivalent).
0.3 ‘ ’  ’ 
“(W)hat do so-called descriptive phrases. . . denote or signify∗ and what is the
meaning of sentences in which they occur? The apparently obvious answer
that, e.g., ‘the author of Waverley’ signifies Walter Scott, leads to unexpected
difficulties. For, if we admit the further apparently obvious axiom, that the
signification of a composite expression, containing constituents which have
themselves a signification, depends only on the signification of these con-
stituents (not on the manner in which this signification is expressed), then
it follows that the sentence ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ signifies the same
thing as ‘Scott is Scott;’ and this again leads almost inevitably to the conclu-
sion that all true sentences have the same signification (as well as all false
ones).∗∗ Frege actually drew this conclusion; and he meant it in an almost
metaphysical sense, reminding one somewhat of the Eleatic doctrine of the
‘One’. . . ‘The True’. . . being the name he uses for the common signification
of all true propositions∗∗∗. . . (A)ccording to Russell’s terminology and view,
true sentences ‘indicate’ facts. . . Furthermore, he uses ‘denote’. . . for the rela-
tion between things and names. . . (In his view) different true sentences indi-
cate many different things. Therefore. . . it is necessary (for him) either to drop
the. . . principle about the signification (i.e., in Russell’s terminology the corre-
sponding one about the denotation and indication) of composite expressions
or to deny that a descriptive phrase denotes the object described. Russell did
the latter∗∗∗ by taking the viewpoint that a descriptive phrase denotes nothing
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at all but has meaning only in context. . . I cannot help feeling that the problem
raised by Frege’s puzzling conclusion has only been evaded by Russell’s Theory
of Descriptions and that there is something behind it which is not yet com-
pletely understood.” (Gödel 1944, pp. 128–30.)
________________________________________
 (’)
∗I use the term ‘signify’ in the sequel because it corresponds to the German word
‘bedeuten’ which Frege, who first treated the question under consideration, used
in this connection.
∗∗The only further assumptions one would need in order to obtain a rigorous
proof would be: (1) that‘ϕ(a)’ and the proposition ‘a is the object which has
the property ϕ and is identical with a’ mean the same thing and (2) that every
proposition ‘speaks about something,’ i.e., can be brought to the form ϕ(a). Fur-
thermore one would have to use the fact that for any two objects a, b there exists
a true proposition of the form ϕ(a, b) as e.g., a 6= b or a = a.b = b.1
∗∗∗Cf. ‘Sinn and Bedeutung’. . . ”
0.4 ’ 
By ‘Gödel’s slingshot’ I mean an argument that Gödel sketched mainly in or-
der to state Russell’s response to it, and also, one gathers, for its philosophical
interest and, to Gödel’s mind, deep significance. By ‘an argument’ I mean a
categorical argument, that is, a claim that certain things, premises, are true,
and that from them a certain thing, a conclusion, follows. Premises of argu-
ments are not merely assumed or supposed, they are asserted. An argument
is sound if and only if its two–part claim is true, that is, if and only if it is
valid, and its premises are true. After indicating how Russell could evade what
Gödel depicts as essentially Frege’s argument in "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung (1892),
Gödel expressed puzzlement regarding what is ‘fundamentally’ wrong with this
argument.
Coming is a carefully articulated and developed Gödelian slingshot that
would be a collapsing argument that established that there are fewer proposi-
tions and facts than are dreamt of by some philosophers. This argument, rather
than being made, could be merely taken up and studied “to draw out inconsis-
tencies. . . lurking in a position” (Neale and Dever 1997, p. 150). Indeed, Neale
and Josh Dever, in response to objections in (Oppy 1997) to (Neale 1995), write
that “Gödel’s Slingshot is simply an analytic tool that can reveal when the com-
mitments one has already made lead one to inconsistency” (pp. 150–1, in Sec-
tion 4, “Methodological Muddles”). It can be taken and studied to such ends,
but, when opposing it and similar arguments by Church, Quine, and Davidson,
Neale casts it and them as “collapsing argument(s) designed to  that there
are fewer items of a given kind than might be supposed. . . (in order) to under-
mine several philosophic theses most notably. . . that there are facts to which
true sentences correspond. . . (and) that sentences designate propositions” (1995,
1Neither Neale nor I make use of this ‘further fact’ that Gödel says one would have to use.
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p. 761, bold emphasis added; cf., 2001, p. 9).2 Neale opposes these arguments as
arguments: he opposes them at least in part because he opposes their ‘Eleatic
conclusions’ for facts and propositions. I too oppose them for this reason, and
study them to expose their errors regarding identities of facts and proposition,
and for the interest of their possible description–theory technologies.
0.5  
1. A Gödelian slinghot for a conclusion limited to ‘subject–predicate’ sen-
tences.
2. Extending this argument to all sentences.
3. Premise (iii) of this slingshot, and Neale’s assumption G1 for his.
4. Prospects of Gödelian slingshots in three description calculi.
5. Frege’s argument.
6. Davidsonian collapsing arguments.
7. Monty and me, and Church’s slingshot.
8. Reflections.
1        
‘–’ 
The limited conclusion of the argument of this section is that true ‘subject–
predicate’ sentences of a language, or language–segment, L, that meets condi-
tions laid down in coming premises, all express the same proposition or ‘stand
for’ the same fact, and that false ones all express a single other proposition.
L can be an interpreted formal language, a natural language such as English,
or a segment of a natural language. The coming argument is valid. It wants
to embarrass the theory that ‘true sentences’ express true propositions, that
is, facts, and can express different true propositions, and that ‘false sentences’
express false propositions and can express different false propositions. The
argument serves this purpose only if its premises are true, if not of natural lan-
guages, then at least of formal languages that might recommend themselves as
frameworks for ‘ideal languages’, and of propositions and facts.
Regarding propositions and facts, contrary to Alfred Tarski, as observed in
Section 1.3 of (Sobel 2006c), I consider propositions to be the primary bearers
2Neale includes under ‘collapsing arguments’, arguments for other kinds of ‘collapses’ such as
of “modal distinctions. . . in systems that combine modality and quantification” (ibid.). I confine
the rubric in what follows to arguments that would ‘collapse’ propositions into just two (or classes
of logically equivalent propositions into just two), and facts into just one.
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of truth and falsity, count a sentence–token as true/false if and only if it ex-
presses a true/false proposition, and count a sentence–type as true if and only
if its possible tokens are all true. Facts, plain facts of English, seem to be identi-
cal with true propositions. For example, the true proposition that snow is white
is, on the face of it, the fact that snow is white. When that snow is white is said to
be true, and when it is said to be a fact, it is the same thing that is said to be
true, and that is a fact, unless the tokens of the name ‘that snow is white’ in the
attribution of truth, and in the classification as a fact, denote different things.
There is, in my view, no good reason for thinking that they do that. In my view
facts are true propositions. It may be that “(s)ome philosophers vehemently
deny this” (Neale 2001, p. 203), though another possibility is that they mean by
facts not ‘plain facts of English’, but ‘truth–makers’ as it is sometimes said that
‘Russellian facts’ would be. Plain facts, since identical with true propositions,
cannot be what make true propositions true.3
1.1  
 
(i) For sentences ϕ and ϕ ′ of L, if a ϕ ′ comes from ϕ by replacement of a
term in an ‘extensional position’ by a term that has the same denotation,
or by replacement of a sentence in an ‘extensional position’ by a sentence
that expresses the same proposition, then ϕ and ϕ ′ express the same
proposition.
Cf.: “the signification of a composite expression, containing constituents
which have themselves a signification, depends only on the signification of
these constituents” (Gödel 1944, p. 129). I have assumed that ‘constituents’ of a
composite expression are for Gödel expressions that occupy ‘extensional posi-
tions’. For example, I assume: that while ‘Hesperus’ is a constituent of ‘Hesperus
is a planet.’, it is not a constituent of ‘An ancient name for the third planet
from the Sun is ‘Hesperus’.’; and that while ‘Helen is home’ is a constituent of
‘If Helen is home, she will answer the phone.’; it is not a constituent of, ‘Henry
said, “Helen is home,” and nothing more.’
The‘significations’ in Gödel’s sense of terms and sentences of language L
are, respectively, their denotations, and the propositions they express. Gödel
runs together Russell’s indications and denotations: For Russell, true sentences
indicate facts, and names denote objects; to ‘signify’ in Gödel’s sense is to ‘in-
dicate or denote’ in Russell’s. Gödel refers to the just quoted principle in these
words: “the above mentioned principle about signification (i.e., in Russell’s
terminology the corresponding one about   ”)
3“But what are propositions and facts such as that the moon is a satellite of the earth?” I’m
not sure I understand the question, comparable as it is to questions like, “But what are numbers
such as three?” and “What are colours such as yellow?” As for what propositions are not, one
cannot do better for starters than “Propositions” in (Cartwright 1987).
Jordan Howard Sobel, “Collapsing Arguments”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 122–161
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008 127
of composite expressions” (p. 130, bold emphasis added). This terminologi-
cal decision of Gödel’s has had unfortunate effects on some of his interpreters.
When speaking for myself I use ‘express’ for the relation of sentences to propo-
sitions, and for to the relation to facts of sentences that express true proposi-
tions (of course, since, as said in note 2, I identify facts and true propositions).
What premise (i) is not. It is not simply the assumption that, as far as its
sentences go, L is an extensional language, or the extensional part of a language, in
the sense in which the languages of standard logical systems are extensional,
which is that ‘the designations of their complex semantically complete units
(terms and formulas) being determined by the designations of their compo-
nents’ (Kalish, et. al., 1980, p. 379).
To spell out what premise (i) is not, let ’ext ’ between closed terms or
sentences of L be short for ‘has the same extension as’, where the ‘extension’
of a closed term is the object it names, and the ‘extension’ of a sentence is its
‘truth–value’.4
Premise (i) is not simply the assumption that, for any sentences ϕ and ϕ ′,
and terms or sentences χ and χ ′, if
χext χ ′,
and ϕ ′ comes from ϕ by replacing an occurrence of χ in an extensional
position by an occurrence of χ ′, then
ϕext ϕ ′.
Whether or not L is an extensional language, or an extensional part of a
language, in this sense of ‘extensional’ is beside the point of premise (i).
What premise (i) is. To spell out what premise (i) is, let ‘<expr> ’ between
names of closed terms be short for ‘has the same designatum as’: ‘<expr> ’
between names means the same as ‘ext ’. Let ‘<expr> ’ between sentences
4‘Truth–value’? “This phrase is due to Frege.” (Whitehead and Russell 1927, p. 7n.) “Frege’s
first use of truth–values is in Funktion and Begriff of 1891 and in his paper of 1892"(Church 1958,
p. 25n27). “The explicit use of two truth–values appears for the first time in a paper by C. S.
Peirce in the American Journal of Mathematics, vol. 7 (1885)” (Church, loc. cit.).
“By the truth–value of a sentence I understand the circumstance of its being true or false.
There are no other truth–values. For brevity I call the one the True, and the other the False.”
(Frege 1960, p. 63.) With these words, writes Göran Sundholm, were ‘truth–values’ intro-
duced into logic: he “argues. . . that the explanations offered (of ‘truth–values’ were) insufficient”
(“Truth–Value,” Logica 2004 Abstracts, p. 51).
Without claiming to interpret or fully agree with Frege, or to explain a notion that will “carry
the philosophical burden it has been given ever since” (ibid.), here is what I make of truth–values.
There are propositions, and amongst their properties are truth and falsity. Truth is the property
that every true proposition, and no false proposition, has. Falsity is similarly related to false
propositions. So far, plain fact, not stipulation. Now comes a stipulation: truth and falsity are
‘truth–values’, and there are no other ‘truth–values’. Truth–value is, by this stipulation, to truth
and falsity, as colour is to black and white, except that while there are colours other than black
and white, there are no truth–values other than truth and falsity.
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be short for ‘expresses the same proposition as’: ‘<expr> ’ between sentences
does not mean the same as ‘ext ’. Premise (i), spelled out, is the principle that,
for any sentences ϕ, ϕ ′, ψ, and ψ ′ :
 ϕ ′ comes from ϕ by replacement of an occurrence of ψ in an exten-
sional position by ψ ′, and ψ and ψ ′ are co-expressive,
ψ <expr> ψ ′,
or ϕ ′ comes from ϕ by replacement of an occurrence of δ in an exten-
sional position by an occurrence of δ ′, and δ and δ ′ are co-designating
names,
δ <expr> δ ′;

ϕ <expr> ϕ ′.
(ii) Definite descriptions of L are terms.
(iii) For variable α, closed term A, formula ϕα of L in which α is free in
an extensional position, and sentence ϕA of L that comes from ϕα by
proper substitution of A for α : if ϕA is true; then
A is identical with the object α such that, α is identical with A&ϕα,
i.e.,
A = the object α such that (α = A&ϕα)
is a sentence of L, or a translation of a sentence of L,5
and this sentence and ϕA express the same proposition: in short,
if ϕA is true, then ϕA <expr> A = the object α such that (α = A&ϕα).
Cf.: “ ‘ϕ (A)’ and the (sentence) ‘A is the object which has the property ϕ and
is identical to A’ mean the same thing” (Gödel 1944, p. 129n5). I have added,
without prejudice, the qualifying clause ‘if ϕ(a) is true’. Gödel may have taken
this qualification for granted, since he was concerned only parenthetically also
5‘The Moon is identical with the object that is identical with The Moon and a natural satel-
lite of The Earth’ is a sentence of English, and the literal translation, under the scheme—A0:
The Moon; F1 : a is a natural satellite of The Earth—of the sentence of The Description Cal-
culus (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ), ‘A0 = !דx(x = A0 ∧ F1x)’. It is not a literal translation
under this scheme of the Russellian sentence of the R–calculus (Sobel 2006a, Chapter ),
‘{ !דx(x = A0 ∧ F1x}A0 = !דx(x = A0 ∧ F1x)’: a literal translation under that scheme of this sym-
bolic sentence makes explicit that there is exactly one object x such that x is identical with The
Moon and x is a natural satellite of The Earth. The literal translation of this Russellian sentence
is, ‘There is an object such that it and only it is the Moon and a natural satellite of The Earth,
and the Moon is identical with this object’: in symbols, y(x((x = A0 ∧ F1x)↔ y)∧A0 = y).
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with false sentences.6 He writes not of sentences expressing the same proposi-
tion, but of sentences meaning the same thing. He could have written of their
signifying the same thing. He tells us that, in Russell’s terminology, they can
be said to indicate the same thing. Premise (iii) has them expressing the same
proposition, and, thus, given that this is a true proposition, the same fact.7
(iv) Reflexitivity, symmetry, and transitivity of the same–signification relation (i.e.,
for terms the same–denotation relation, and for sentences the
co-expressive relation). For any terms or formulas of L, ε, ε ′, and ε ′′:
reflexitivity, ε <expr> ε; symmetry, ε <expr> ε ′ → ε ′ <expr> ε;
and
transitivity, if ε <expr> ε ′ and ε ′ <expr> ε ′′, then ε <expr> ε ′′.
In short, <expr> is an equivalence relation.
(v) For any sentence ϕ of L that expresses a proposition, p∼∼ϕq is a sentence
of L, or a symbolization of a sentence of L, andϕ and p∼∼ϕq, or sentences
symbolized thereby, express the same proposition.
This premise is not in evidence in (Gödel 1944). I do not know whether in his
own (unpublished) reasoning he relied on it. In the coming deduction, the first
conjunct of the conclusion concerning truths and facts is reached without aid
of premise (v), which serves only the deduction of the second conjunct regarding
falsehoods.8
6Neale does not, in his Gödelian slingshot, enter the qualification that ‘ϕ(a)’ is true. I
come back to this difference between our slingshots in Section 3 below. There is a question
whether in his ‘reconstruction of Gödel’s proof ’ he at this point “captures Gödel’s (intended
proof ) precisely” (1995, p. 778; cf., 2001, p. 131).
7Suppose that it is true that there are black swans in Australia. This proposition is named by the
italicized ‘that’–clause, not by the sentence ‘There are black swans in Australia’. (Cf., King 2002.)
Neale writes: “Frege had the idea that a sentence can stand for either Truth or Falsity. . . On
Russell’s account, a true sentence   a fact.” (1995, p. 765, italic emphasis added.)
However, in quotations that Neale gives, Russell says not that true sentences stand for, but only
that they express facts: e.g., “a fact is ‘the sort of thing expressed by a whole sentence, not by a
single name. . . We express (what we take to be) a fact. . . when we say that a certain thing has a
certain property. . . ’ ((Russell) 1918, pp. 182–3). . . ” (p. 766). I doubt that Russell ever thought of
true sentences as naming facts, and believe “that it is (not) clear that Russell wanted none of this”
where ‘this’ includes Frege’s suggestion that we say that sentences stand for or name The True
and The False. Russell’s attitude towards this exercise of ‘philosophic license’ could, for all that
mattered to him, have been, “Why not?” (as my friend Sten likes to say).
8Neale does not use premise (v) or anything like it in his ‘reconstruction’ of Gödel’s argument.
The explicit conclusion of his Gödelian slingshot is confined to true sentences. (1995, pp. 778–9,
cf., 2001, pp. 130–1.) Similarly for his “Gödel’s Proof in Quinean Format” (2001, p. 181). I use
premise (v) again in the Davidsonian argument of Section 6.1 below that is general for true and
false sentences. A fully general Davidsonian argument of Neale’s does not use anything like
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
‘subject–predicate’ sentences of L that express  propositions or facts,
express the same true proposition or fact; 
‘subject–predicate’ sentences of L that express  propositions express the same false
proposition.
A ‘subject–predicate’ sentence is here a sentence in which a term occurs in
an‘extensional’ position: for examples, ‘The sun is a star.’, ‘No city is larger than
Toronto.’, and ‘If the girl named ‘Helen’ is home, she will answer the door.’ Neither
‘All men are mortal.’ nor ‘Tiny Tim was so-called for his size.’ are ‘subject–
predicate’ sentences.
The conclusion is that, for example, the true sentences, ‘The moon is the
natural satellite of the Earth.’ and ‘The sun is the star around which the Earth
orbits.’, express the same fact!
1.2     
Let ‘T ’ be an operator that, with variables and formulas, makes definite de-
scriptive terms in L, as ‘!ד’ does in the language of The Description Calculus of
(Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ). The coming deduction assumes that ‘T ’ and
‘!ד’ agree in their logics for proper descriptions in extensional contexts: let this
be assumption (*).
    of the limited conclusion, namely,
‘subject–predicate’ sentences of L that express true propositions or facts
express the same one, we assume,
(vi) ϕA is true
(vii) ψB is true
for closed terms or ‘names’ A and B, variable α, formulas ϕα and ψα in which
α and only α is a variable free in an extensional position, and sentences ϕA and
premise (v) (1995, p. 793; 2001, p. 173). Problems with its way are canvassed in Section 6.2.2 below.
Lately, Neale has used something very like premise (v) in “a proof based on Gödel’s slingshot”
(2001, p. 183) that would establish inter alia that materially equivalent ‘subject–predicate’ sen-
tences express the same proposition. The first part of this proof, is for true ‘subject–predicate’
sentences: this part is the same as the proof at (1995, pp. 189–90), and uses nothing like premise
(v). The case for false ‘subject–predicate’ sentences is not taken up in (1995). This deficit is made
up in (2001) where the proof has a second part for this case, in which part we meet something
like premise (v). The proof is addressed to ‘½’, an arbitrary one place connective. He uses in the
second part “the assumption that½ is ()” (2001, p. 183), which assumption legitimates infer-
ences in the proof from ‘½(Fa)’ to ‘½(∼∼Fa)’, and from ‘½(∼∼Gb)’ to ‘½(Gb)’. The annotations
for these inferences feature ‘½+’, which names a rule of inference, that, unlike the other
rules used in his proofs, is not set out before its use, or included in the summary of principles
of inference at the end of the book (2001, pp. 251–2).
Jordan Howard Sobel, “Collapsing Arguments”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 122–161
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008 131
ψB that come respectively from ϕα and ψα by replacing all free occurrences
of α by occurrences of A and B.
To show: ϕA <expr> ψB.
We proceed by cases. In the first case, the referent of A is identical with the
referent of B. In the second, not.
For the  C, we assume,
(viii) A = B
From (vi) and premise (iii) follows,
(ix) ϕA <expr> A = (Tα)(α = A&ϕα)
and from (vii) and premise (iii),
(x) ψB <expr> ψB = (Tα)(α = B&ψα).
From (viii), and assumption (*), follows p(Tα)(a = A&α = B)q is proper, and
both that p(Tα)(α = A&α = B)q <expr> A, and that p(Tα)(α = A&α =
B)q <expr> B. (‘A = B → ∨y∧ x(x = A ∧ x = B ↔ x = y)’ and ‘∨y∧ x(x =
A ∧ x = B ↔ x = y) → (( !דx(x = A ∧ x = B) = A ∧ !דx(x = A ∧ x = B) = B)’
are theorems of The Description Calculus of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ).)
From these ‘co-expressions’, it follows, by premise (i), that,
(xi) A = B <expr> A = (Tα)(α = A&α = B)
and
(xii) A = B <expr> (Tα)(α = A&α = B) = B,
From (vi) follows ϕA ‘on a line’, and from this and (viii), and assumption (*), it
follows that the descriptions, p(T(α)(α = A&ϕα)q and p(T(α)(α = A&α = B)q
are proper for the same thing. (‘FA→ ∨y∧ x(x = A∧ Fx↔ x = y)’, ‘A = B→∨
y
∧
x(x = A ∧ x = B ↔ x = y)’, and thus ‘FA ∧ A = B → !דx(x = A ∧ Fx) =
!דx(x = A ∧ x = B)’ are theorems of The Description Calculus (Kalish, et. al.,
1980, Ch. .) That is, it follows that,
(xiii) (Tα)(α = A&ϕα) <expr> (Tα)(α = A&α = B)
From (vii) and (viii) it follows similarly that p(Tα)(α = B&ϕα)q and
p(Tα)(α = A&α = B)q are proper for the same thing:
(xiv) (Tα)(α = B&ϕα) <expr> (Tα)(α = A&α = B)
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From (xiii), by premise (i), it follows that pA = (Tα)(α = A&ϕα)q <expr> A =p
(Tα)(α = A&α = B)q, and from this and (ix), by premise (iv) (transitivity), it
follows that,
(xv) ϕA <expr> A = (Tα)(α = A&α = B)
From (x) and (xiv) it follows similarly that,
(xvi) ϕB <expr> B = (Tα)(α = A&α = B)
By premise (iv) (transitivity, symmetry), from (xv) and (xi) it follows that
ϕA <expr>pA = Bq, from (xvi) and (xii) it follows that ϕB <expr>pA = Bq,
from which ‘co-expressions’ it follows that,
(xvii) ϕA <expr> ψB.
This completes the  : deduced from premises (i) through (iv), as-
sumption (*) that says that logic of the operator ‘T ’ is that of the Fregean de-
scription operator ‘!ד’, and assumptions (vi) and (vii) that say that ϕA and ψB
are true is,
if A = B, then ϕA <expr> ψB.
For the  , we assume,
(xviii) A 6= B
from which it follows that,
(xix) pA 6= Bq is true
It follows from (vi) and premise (iii) again that
(xx) ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα)
From (vi) follows ϕA ‘on a line’, and from this and (xviii) and assumption (*)
that,
(xxi) Tα(α = A∧ϕα) <expr> Tα(α = A&α 6= B),
as (xiii) follows from (vi), (viii), by assumption (*). It follows from (xix), by
premise (iii), that
(xxii) A 6= B <expr> A = Tα(α = A&α 6= B).
From (xxi), by premise (i), it follows that pA = Tα(α = A&α 6= B)q <expr>p
A = Tα(α = A ∧ ϕα)
q, and from this and (xxii), by premise (iv) (transitivity), it
follows that,
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(xxiii) A 6= B <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα)
It follows from (xx) and (xxiii), by premise (iv) (symmetry, transitivity), that
(xxiv) ϕA <expr> A 6= B
It follows from (vii) and (xviii) similarly that
(xxv) ψB <expr> A 6= B.
Finally, by premise (iv) (symmetry, transitivity), it follows from (xxiv) and (xxv)
that
(xxvi) ϕA <expr> ψB
That completes the  : deduced from premises (i) through (iv),
assumption (*) that says that logic of the operator ‘T ’ is that of the Fregean
description operator ‘ !ד’, and assumptions (vi) and (vii) that say that ϕA and ψB
are true is,
if A 6= B, then ϕA <expr> ψB.
Since ϕA and ψB are any true ‘subject–predicate’ sentences, established by our
two cases is that premises (i) through (iv) entail that ‘subject–predicate’ sen-
tences of L that express true propositions express the same one.
   , that
‘subject–predicate’ sentences of L that express false propositions, all express
the same one,
we assume,
(xxvii) ϕA is false
(xxviii) ψB is false
It follows from (xxvii) and (xxviii) that
(xxix) p∼ϕAq is true
and
(xxx) p∼ψBq is true
Therefore, by adaptations of lines (viii) through (xxvi), it follows that whether
or not A = B,
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(xxx) ∼ϕA<expr>∼ψB
We have, by premise (iv) (reflexitivity), that p∼∼ϕAq <expr>p∼∼ϕAq, from which
and (xxx) it follows by premise (i), that
(xxxi) ∼∼ϕA<expr>∼∼ψB.
From this it follows, by premise (v), that
(xxxii) ϕA <expr> ψB.
That completes reasoning from premises (i) through (v) for the limited conclu-
sion that,
‘subject–predicate’ sentences of L that express true propositions or facts,
express the same truth or fact;
and sentences of L that express false propositions, express the same falsehood.
2      
For the unrestricted conclusion that
sentences of L that express true propositions or facts express the
same truth or fact, and sentences of L that express false proposi-
tions express the same falsehood,
Gödel adds something like that,
   ϕ  L    ,
   ‘–’ ϕ ′  L  
ϕ  ϕ ′    .
He makes what he casts as the ‘further assumption’ “that every proposition
‘speaks about something,’ i.e., can be brought to the form ϕ(a)” (Gödel 1944,
p. 129n).
For example, corresponding in the manner contemplated to sentence ‘all
men snore’ would be, for one, the sentence ‘Clinton is an x such that all men snore’
with subject ‘Clinton’, and predicate ‘is an x such that all men snore’ (Neale
1995, p. 778: ‘Clinton’ is replaced by ‘Socrates’ in Neale 2001, p. 130.). If such
correspondences “are found repugnant one can still follow Gödel’s argument
through in connection with atomic sentences” (ibid.). A problem with some
such correspondences, related specifically to this one of Neale’s, is that per-
haps, if Clinton had not existed, then, while there would still have been the
proposition that all men snore, there would not have been the proposition that
Clinton is an x such that all men snore. That would be a ‘singular proposition’
about Clinton, and a case can be made for the existence of this proposition’s
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presupposing the existence of Clinton. (Cf., Cartwright 1998.) If there is this
difference between these propositions, then they cannot be one and the same
proposition. A response available to Gödel to this problem with his ‘further
assumption’ would be to change it to say that every proposition ‘speaks about
something that exists necessarily’. I believe that Gödel thought that numbers
are necessary existents, and I know that he was inclined to think that God is a
necessary existent (cf., Sobel 2004, Chapter ).
3  ()   ,  ’  1
 
Premise (iii) is weaker than Neale’s G1 (1995, p. 777; 2001, p. 130):
ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα).
Premise (iii) licenses entries on lines of a proof of conditionals of the form
ϕA is true→ ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα),
for variable α, closed term A that has a denotation, formula ϕα in which α and
only α is free, and sentence ϕA that comes from ϕα by replacing all free oc-
currences of α in extensional positions by occurrences ofA, which conditionals
correspond to sentences,
ϕA → (ϕA ↔ A = Tα(α = A&ϕα)),
that are valid in calculi for denoting terms in which T–descriptions are terms.
(‘FA→ (FA↔ A = !דx(x = A∧ Fx))’ is a theorem of The Description Calculus
(Kalish, et. al., 1980, Ch. VI.)
Neale’s G1, which adds nothing to Gödel’s explicit words for his first ‘fur-
ther assumption’, licenses entries without further ado of the consequents of those
conditionals. These consequents correspond to biconditionals that are valid in
only some calculi for denoting terms in which descriptions are terms. It may
be observed that the inferences that Neale bases on G1 to show that “all true
sentences stand for the same fact” (2001, p. 178), would be served as well by
my premise (iii). Similarly for “a proof based on Gödel’s slingshot” (2001, p. 183),
begun in (1995) on pages 789 and 790, and completed in (2001) on pages 185
and 186.
What, aside from this matter of accommodation in more description cal-
culi, could recommend premise (iii) over G1? Nothing, if what recommends
both G1 and premise (iii) is exactly the ‘sense’ that, for example, ϕA and pA =
(Tα)(α = A&ϕα)q surely entail one another, and are ‘logically equivalent’ when
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‘T ’ means the definite article ‘the’ of English.9 Neale writes that “any theory of
descriptions must be compatible with this fact (as Russell’s is)∗” (1995, p. 789;
2001, p. 180), and as The Description Calculus is not.10 The reference of ‘this
fact’ is precisely to the purported fact that
T– ϕA / ∴ A = Tα(α = A&ϕα)
and
T– A = Tα(α = A&ϕα) / ∴ ϕA
“are valid rules of inference in extensional contexts” (1995, p. 789; 2001,
p. 180).11 The sentence
ϕA ↔ A = Tα(α = A&ϕα)
is a theorem of any calculus in which these rules are primitive or derivable.
∗The exact truth for Russell’s theory, in which descriptions are not terms, is
that in it the rules
!דּ– ϕA / ∴ !דα(α = A∧ϕα)A = !דּα(α = A∧ϕα)
9Scare–quotes around ‘logical equivalence’ since Neale, in (1995) and (2001), uses it in (and
presumably only in) a model–theoretic sense that is not applicable to English, for which ‘models’
are not defined. He writes, “following Tarski, and common practice, let us say that (ϕ and ψ are
logically equivalent) if, and only if, ϕ and ψ have the same truth–value in every model” (1995,
p. 791, cf., 2001, p. 55).
10As Neale knows: 1995, p. 798; 2001, p. 194. For example, as said, ‘FA → (FA ↔ A = !דx(x =
A ∧ FA))’ is a theorem of The Description Calculus of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ), but,
I now add, ‘FA ↔ A = !דx(x = A ∧ FA)’ is not. This sentence is false in the minimal model—
Universe: {0}; Improper Designatum: 0; F1 : {}; A0 : 0.
11In (1995) and (2001) we find that “any adequate theory of descriptions. . . must be compatible
with this fact (the validity of these rules in extensional contexts)” (1995, p. 789; 2001, p. 180),
meaning, presumably, any theory of descriptions that for extensional contexts agrees with the ‘logic’
of English definite descriptions must validate these inferences in extensional contexts. These rules
are, in Greg Restall’s view, valid for “any reasonable theory of descriptions” (Restall 2004, p. 421).
Restall implies, however, that theories such as The Description Calculus of (Kalish, et. al.,
Chapter ) satisfy this condition for reasonableness. He should have known, since Neale says
so, that this is false. Relatedly, Restall implies that ‘FA’ and ‘A = !דx(x = A ∧ Fx) ′ are logically
equivalent in such theories (p. 425), which is false. Restall also says that these rules are valid for
descriptions in Russell’s theory, which, as is shortly to be explained in the text, is notexactly true.
These mistakes spoil Restall’s demonstration without effort—“I simply took (a) pre-existing
account. . . ‘off the shelf ’.” (P. 425)—of the error of a Gödelian collapsing argument addressed to
an extension of his ‘starter’ theory of facts that includes a version of this well–known referen-
tial theory of descriptions. The error, which Restall thinks he identifies by elimination, is that
certain rules for substituting identical terms are not unrestrictedly valid in this extension. His
demonstration would be better served by a theory such as The Russellian Theory of Descrip-
tions of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ), which theories are mentioned by Neale for the very
virtue that Restall’s demonstration–by–elimination needs (Neale 1995, p. 798; 2001, p. 195).
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and
!דּ– !דּα(α = A ∧ ϕα)A = !דּα(α = A ∧ ϕ ′) ∴ ϕ are
derivable, and sentences
ϕA ↔ !דּα(α = A∧ϕα)A = !דּα(α = A∧ϕα)
are theorems, in which rules and sentences p!דּα(α = A∧ϕα)A = !דּα(α = A ∧
ϕα)
q is not an identity–sentence. ‘!דּ’ is here Russell’s description operator that
makes formulas. It is used in (Sobel 2006a, Chapter ) for an extension
of The Description Calculus of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ) in which
extension the descriptive term–maker ‘!ד’ and its rules remain.
But, the ‘sense’ that ϕA and pA = Tα(α = A&ϕα)q should be logically
equivalent, along with the associated ‘sense’ that these rules should be valid,
is not all that premise (iii) has going for it. To take ‘T ’ in the sense of ‘the’,
let me replace it by ‘’ and shift parentheses. If the English description
‘(x)(x = A& Fx)’ is proper, which it is if and only if ‘FA’ is true; then‘FA’
and ‘A = (x)(x = A& Fx)’ can express the same proposition, for they
will at least express logically equivalent propositions. Perhaps, however, if ‘FA’
is false, so that ‘(x)(x = A& Fx)’ is improper, we should say that ‘A =
(x)(x = A& Fx)’ does not express a proposition, in which case our two
sentences cannot express the same proposition. An advantage of premise (iii)
over G1 is that it leaves open the somewhat attractive theoretical possibility
that, if ‘(x)(x = A& Fx)’ is improper because ‘FA’ is false, then though ‘FA’
expresses a proposition, ‘A = (x)(x = A& Fx)’ does not.12 Reflection on
this advantage can detract from the sense that in an ‘adequate’ theory of de-
scriptions ϕA and pA = (α)(α = A&ϕα)q must be logically equivalent,
and that - and -elim must be valid. Related advantages of premise
(iii) over G1 are that it leaves open: (a), that if ‘A’ abbreviates a non-denoting
proper name such as ‘Santa Claus’, or an improper description, then we should
say that neither ‘FA’ nor ‘A = (x)(x = A& Fx)’ express propositions, so
that they cannot express the same proposition; and, (b), that if ‘A’ abbreviates
a non-denoting proper name, then we should say (instead) that though ‘FA’
does not express a proposition, ‘A = (x)(x = A& Fx)’ expresses a false
proposition (for example, a proposition that entails that there is something
that is identical with Santa Claus), so that again they do not express the same
12Cf.: “Mark Sainsbury has pointed out to me that certain forms of free logic must deny that
extensional contexts are +!ד–conv (i.e., must deny that both !ד– and !ד– are valid in
extensional contexts).” (Neale 2001, p. 180n4.)
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proposition.13, 14
4       

4.1 ’   
The slingshot of Section 1 is not sound for the language of Russell’s Theory
of Descriptions. Descriptions in this theory are, contrary to premise (ii) of
that argument, not ‘terms’.15 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions allows him to
evade “Frege’s puzzling conclusion” (Gödel 1944, p. 130), which Gödel implies
is that true sentences all ‘indicate’ the same fact. “Russell avoids (this) ‘Eleatic’
13But cannot both G1 and premise (iii) be rejected out of hand on the ground that, for ex-
ample, “‘Fa’ expresses a monadic (proposition) (the attribution of the property F to a), and
‘a = ( !דx)(x = a.Fx)’ expresses a dyadic fact (the attribution of identity to the pair of a and
a)” (Oppy 1997, p. 125)? Certainly these sentences differ syntactically: the first is a ‘subject–
predicate’, and the second is an ‘identity’ sentence. It is, however, not clear that we should say
that the propositions expressed by these sentences inherit these syntactical differences. Should
we say that propositions expressed by ‘P’, ‘(P ∧ P)’, and ‘(P ∨ P)’ inherit their syntactical differ-
ences?
14Premise (iii) leaves open the possibility that at least some sentences that feature improper
definite descriptions in extensional contexts are best said not to express propositions (and so
not to be true or false). Premise (i) is not similarly tolerant, but it can be modified to be so. For
example, another valid Gödelian slingshot comes from mine by, for one thing, ‘reducing’ premise
(i) to,
The ‘significations’ of terms and sentences, that have significations, are, respec-
tively, their denotations and the propositions they express, definite descriptions
have denotations if and only if they are proper, and “the signification of a com-
posite expression, containing constituents which have themselves a signification,
depends only on the signification of these constituents” (Gödel 1944, p. 129). In
particular, if a sentence ϕ ′ comes from ϕ by replacement of a term in an exten-
sional position by a term that has the same denotation, or by replacement of a
sentence in an extensional position by a sentence that expresses the same propo-
sition, then, if ϕ expresses a proposition, ϕ ′ express the same proposition.
and, for a second thing, adding the premise,
A sentence is true only if it expresses a proposition, and identity–sentences and
their negations are true only if their constituent terms have denotations.
15Terms of standard formal languages are distinguished from formulas syntactically, and they
are accorded different semantic treatments. The R–calculus of (Sobel 2006a, Chapter )
features Fregean descriptions such as ‘!דxFx’ as well as Russellian descriptions such as ‘ !דּxFx’.
Fregean descriptions occur in exactly the positions that can be occupied by name letters or
individual constants. Russellian descriptions occur additionally braced in scope–indicators, for
example, ‘{ !דּxFx}’. Interpretations of the language assign to closed Fregean descriptions elements
of their domains as denotations. Not so for Russellian descriptions. Interpretations generate
extensions not for Russellian descriptions, but for closed Russellian–description formulas such
as ‘{!דּxFx}G!דּxFx’ to which the truth values of related generalizations: the truth value assigned to




x(Fx ↔ x − y) ∧ Gy)’.
To the question, but what then does ‘!דּxFx’ denote, the answer is, “It does not denote anything.
It does not have an extension. It is, in itself, ‘semantically incomplete’.”
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conclusion because he is a Russellian about definite descriptions” (Neale 1995,
p. 779; 2001, p. 133). He avoids ‘Eleatic conclusions’ that would have sentences
that express truths express a single truth or fact, and sentences that express
falsehoods express a single falsehood.
It has been suggested that, since, “when a predicate F applies exactly to one
object, the (Russellian) description ‘( !דx)(Fx)’ can be treated for derivational
purposes as if it were a singular term” (Rodriguez-Pereya 1998, p. 518), Gödelian
slingshots can be modified to make irrelevant that Russellian descriptions are
not terms.16 The question, however, is whether when premises (iii) and (i) are
modified to exploit the term–like behaviour in derivations of proper Russellian
descriptions, they lose nothing in plausibility. The plausibility of premise (iii)
does not suffer when it is so modified, but that of premise (i) does.17 A simple
modification to exploit the term–like behaviour of proper Russellian descrip-
tions of the R–calculus of Chapter () in (Sobel 2006a) would, to premise
(i),
For sentences ϕ and ϕ ′ of L, if a ϕ ′ comes from ϕ by replacement
of a term in an ‘extensional position’ by a term that has the same
denotation, or by replacement of a sentence in an ‘extensional po-
sition’ by a sentence that expresses the same proposition, then ϕ
and ϕ ′ express the same proposition.
add,
If there is exactly one ψ and exactly one ψ ′, and the object that
satisfies ψ is the object that satisfies ψ ′, in other words, if
{!דּαψ}{ !דּαψ ′} !דּαψ = !דּαψ ′,
is true, and a sentence ϕ ′ comes from sentence ϕ by replacement
of an occurrence of scope–indicator p{ !דּαψ}q in an extensional con-
text and occurrences of p{ !דּαψ}q in its scope by an occurrence of
p{ !דּαψ}q and occurrences of p!דּαψ ′q; then ϕ and ϕ ′ express the same
proposition. (I use ‘!דּ’ for Russellian descriptions, and ‘!ד’ for
Fregean descriptions.)
This addition is implausible, and this for reasons that tell with equal force
against more complicated modifications that restrict sentence ϕ to exactly the
kinds to which the replacement–license would be addressed in the reasoning
of Section 2, if it were adapted to !דּ–descriptions. Consider that whether or
not it is true that though
16Neale promises that this is so (2001, pp. 132–3), and with his “Complete Connective Proof”
(2001, p. 173) shows that it is so.
17Neale criticizes his “Complete Connective Proof” similarly: (2001, pp. 174–5).
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{!דּxFx}{ !דּxGx}!דּxFx = !דּxGx,
under the scheme—M : a is the morning star; N : a is the evening star; V : a is
Venus—expresses a truth; the propositions expressed by ‘{ !דּxMx}V !דּxMx’ and
‘{!דּxNx}V !דּxNx’ have different implications. The first entails that
there is exactly one morning star (i.e., that there is exactly one celestial body
is salient in morning skies), and the second entails that there is exactly one
evening star (i.e., that there is exactly one celestial body that is salient in
evening skies). Since the propositions expressed actually have different logi-
cal properties, they are certainly distinct propositions. Frege would consider
sufficient to the point, the possibility of their having different epistemological
properties. Cf.:
“(T)he thought in the sentence 18 ‘The morning star is a body illu-
minated by the Sun’ differs from that in the sentence ‘The evening
star is a body illuminated by the Sun’. Anybody who did not know
that the evening star is the morning star might hold the one
thought to be true, the other false.” (Frege 1892 (1960), p. 62.)
His idea may have been that sentences ϕ and ψ express the same proposition
only if the proposition expressed by their equivalence, p(ϕ↔ ψ)q is analytically
necessary: perhaps Frege would have been happy to add ‘even if this person
understood these sentences perfectly well’.
4.2     (, . ., 1980,  )
Premise (ii) is true of the language of this calculus: !ד–descriptions are ‘terms’.
There would be trouble for premise (iii) for the language of this calculus, if
it said, without qualification, that “‘ϕ(a)’ and the proposition ‘a is the object
which has the property ϕ and is identical to a’ mean the same thing” (Neale
quoting Gödel; 1995, p. 777; 2001, p. 130). As Neale observes, in any calculus for
which, “in each model M, some arbitrary element ∗M (of its domain). . . serves
as the referent (in M) of all descriptions that are improper. . . (, there can be)
a model M in which ‘Fa’ is false and the singular term ‘a’ refers to ∗M. . . In
18Let ‘a thought of a sentence’ be not a thought about it, but something like an utterance of
it made in thought. Let thoughts1 be thoughts of propositions. These thoughts are ‘necessarily
in minds’. Let thoughts2 be propositions. These thoughts are not necessarily in minds, ever.
Frege’s thoughts (gedanken) are not thoughts1: A sentence is said to contain (enhalten) a thought
(gedanke). In his commentary Montgomery Furth writes, “(a) ‘thought’ being ‘not the subjective
performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common prop-
erty of many thinkers’ (‘On Sense and Denotation,’ n. 5)” (Gödel 1964, p. xxi, n. 20). Frege’s
words here quoted suggest that he intended gedanken to be propositions, and thus thoughts2.
His ‘gedanke’ is sometimes translated ‘proposition’: cf., page 89n5 of Herbert Feigl’s translation
in (Feigl and Sellars, 1949). However, Frege identifies the gedanke of a sentence with its ‘sense’,
and propositions are not senses or meanings of sentences, since there are meaningful sentences
that do not express propositions. In my view Frege meant by ‘gedanke’ propositions, which he
mistakenly identified with senses or meanings of sentences.
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M(‘Fa ′) is false while (‘a = (!דx)(x = a · Fx)’) is true” (1995, p. 798; 2001, p. 194).
The sentence of The Description Calculus,
ϕA ↔ A = !דα(α = A∧ϕα)
that corresponds to G1
ϕA <expr> A = !דα(α = A∧ϕα),
is not a theorem of this calculus. Premise (iii) for The Description Calculus,
ϕA is true→ ϕA <expr> A = !דα(α = A∧ϕα),
does not have this problem. It corresponds to the theorem
ϕA → (ϕA ↔ A = !דα(α = A∧ϕα)).
Premise (i), on the other hand, is problematic for The Description Calcu-
lus for reasons elaborated in Section 5.2 for Frege’s likely resistance to Gödel’s
slingshot. Certainly names of the same thing can be freely exchanged without
affecting the truth–value of an interpreted sentence of The Description Calcu-
lus. But premise (i) says that such replacements cannot affect the propositions
(thoughts) expressed by the ‘before and after sentences’. Given that ‘names’ in
The Description Calculus include ‘descriptive names’, that principle is, to say
the least, prima facie implausible.
4.3 ‘  ’  (, . . 1980,  )
Neale faults theories of description such as that of The Description Calcu-
lus a model M for which feature an “element ∗M in the domain (over which
the variables of quantification range) (which) serves as the referent. . . of all de-
scriptions that are improper. . . ” The fault is that in “a model M in which ‘Fa’
is false and. . . ’a’ refers to ∗M. . . (‘Fa’) is false while (‘A = (ιxx)(x = a.Fx)’) is
true” (Neale 1995, p. 798; 2001, p. 195.) This at once frustrates Neale’s Gödelian
slingshot, which uses G1 and requires that sentences
ϕA ↔ A = ια(α = A&ϕα)
should be theorems, and, in Neale’s opinion “demonstrates. . . just how bad a
treatment (of descriptions The Description Calculus) is” (ibid.)
Neale writes that “(t)he problem just raised could be eradicated, of course,
by a special stipulation to the effect that only those singular terms that are
also descriptions can be assigned ∗M as their reference in M.” (Ibid.) The
‘Russellian Theory’ of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ) does that and more.
In it, descriptions are still terms, and descriptive names are said all to designate
in a model whether or not they are proper, but if improper they designate
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a thing that is not in the universe of the model that is the range of quantifiers, they
designate a thing that does not exist in the model. In this case, though they
‘designate’, they are said not denote, that being a relation that terms have only
to existing things, that is, to elements of the universe of the model (Kalish, et.
al., 1980, p. 396). In this ‘Russelian theory’, every sentence,
ϕA ↔ A = 7α(α = A∧ϕα),
is a theorem.
I use ‘7’ for the descriptive terms of the calculus of Chapter , and not
‘!ד’ which is used for the descriptive terms of both that chapter and the descrip-
tive terms of Chapter . Not every instance of a theorem of ‘The Russellian
Theory’ is a a theorem. However, there is below a derivation for the sentence,
FA↔ A = 7x(x = A∧ Fx)
of a kind that ensures that every instance of this sentence is a theorem of
‘The Russellian Theory’. The primitive rules of this theory come from those
of The Description Calculus by restricting the rule of Identity to terms other
than 7–descriptions, elevating Symmetry and derived forms of Leibniz’s Law
to the status of primitive rules, restricting  and  to terms other than 7–
terms, * deleting the rules Proper Descriptions and Improper Descriptions for
!ד–descriptions, and adding, for ‘7’, the rules:
(7) For distinct variables α and β and formula ϕ
/∴
∧
β[β = 7αϕ]↔ ∧α(ϕ↔ α = β);
–1 For k–place predicate letter pi and terms τ1, . . . , τk,
piτl . . . τk/∴
∨
αα = τ1 ∧ . . .∧ αα = τk;
and
–2 For terms γ and δ,
γ = δ/∴ αα = γ.
These rules are said to “embody the initial Russellian intuition that subject–
predicate sentences are false if the subject term lacks a denotation” (p. 400).
A remarkable feature of this theory is that not every instance of a theorem
is itself a theorem. (pp. 398–9 and 404.) However all instances of theorems
derivable without recourse to –1 of –2 are themselves theorems (p. 404)..
Now comes in Figure 1 such a derivation of ‘FA↔ A = 7x(x = A∧ Fx)’.
The Russellian Theory ‘delivers’ G1, if one assumes that logically equivalent
sentences express the same proposition. In any case it is not inconsistent with
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1.  FA↔ A (24,)
2.  FA→= 7x(A∧ Fx) (14, )
3. FA ()
4.  x(x = A∧ Fx↔ x = A) (5, )
5.  x = A∧ Fx→ x = A (7, )
6. x = A∧ Fx ()
7. x = A 7, S
8.  x = A→ x = A∧ Fx (11, )
9. x = A ()
10. Fx 3, 9, 
11. x = A∧ Fx 9, 10,Adj
12. x = A∧ Fx↔ x = A 5, 8, 
13. y(y = 7x(x = A∧ Fx)↔
x(x = A∧ Fx↔ x = y)) (7)
14. A = 7x(x = A∧ Fx) 13, (A): p. 410,
, 4,
15  A = 7x(x = A∧ Fx)→ FA (23, )
16. A = 7x(x = A∧ Fx) ()
17. 7x(x = A∧ Fx) = A 16, Sym
18. yy = 7x(x = A∧ Fx)
19. y(y = 7x(x = A∧ Fx)
↔ x(x = A∧ Fx↔ x = y)) (7)
20. x(x = A∧ Fx↔ x = A) 19, (A), a,
16,
21. 7x(x = A∧ Fx) = A∧ F7x(x = A∧ Fx)↔ 18, 19, (7x
7x(x = A∧ Fx) = A (x = A∧ Fx))b
22. F7x(x = A∧ Fx) 21, , 17,, S
23. FA 16, 22, 
24. FA↔ A = 7x(x = A∧ Fx) 2, 15, 
a“Inference rules (include). . .. . . restricted to variables and name letters” (Kalish, et. al.,
1980, p. 410).
b is ‘Universal Instantiation for 7–descriptions’. It is a ‘derivable rule’. “ (is the
inference license). . . ∨
γγ = 7αϕ.∧βψ ∴ ψ ′
. . .α, β, and γ are variables, ϕ is a symbolic formula in which γ is not free, and ψ ′ is a
symbolic formula that comes from. . .ψ by proper substitution of p7αϕq for β. . . (This rule)
need not be adopted as primitive. . . ” (Kalish, et. al., 1980, pp. 399–400, with some notational
adjustments.)
Figure 1
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G1, as is any theory that says that sentences ϕA and pA = Tα(α = A&ϕα)q are
not necessarily equivalent. And this theory agrees with premise (ii). Its treat-
ment of descriptions is a bit closer to the ways of English descriptions than is
that of The Description Calculus of Chapter , though it too ‘goes weird’ for
improper descriptions, and lacks resources, as every Fregean treatment of de-
scriptions must, for perspicuous representations of multiple interpretations of
English sentences in which scopes of definite descriptions are indeterminate.19
This theory has, incidentally, the dubious distinction (recently hinted) of hav-
ing theorems not all instances of which are themselves theorems.20 And, to
wrap up its relation to our slingshot, this broadly Fregean theory is no better
placed than The Description Calculus when it comes to premise (i) and the idea
that exchanging descriptive names of the same thing in extensional contexts
cannot affect what proposition is expressed.
5 ’ 
5.1 ’ ,  ,     
    
“(A)ccording to Russell’s terminology and view, true sentences ‘in-
dicate’ facts. . . But (on Russell’s view) different true sentences may
indicate many different (facts).” (Gödel 1944, p. 129.) “Frege’s puz-
zling conclusion has only been evaded by Russell’s theory of de-
scriptions . . . ” (P. 130.)
But what, for Gödel, was ‘Frege’s puzzling conclusion’? It would be that all
true sentences signify the same fact or true proposition. That, however, is
not the conclusion that Frege drew in the passage that Gödel ‘taps’. Frege’s
own conclusion was neither that true sentences all have the same meaning,
nor that they all express the same thought or proposition. Nor was it that
true sentences all have the same truth–value, for which conclusion no argu-
ment is called for. Frege’s conclusion was that, casting sentences as names, this
truth–value of true sentences can be said to be what they name. Frege took for
19This is the most important shortcoming of Fregean treatments of descriptions. “Confu-
sion of primary and secondary occurrences (of descriptions) is a ready source of fallacies where
descriptions are concerned.” (Russell, 1919, p. 179.) Far from serving resolutions of these con-
fusions, formal analyses in Fregean theories can enhance them. This is illustrated for a ‘liar
paradox’ in (Sobel 2006b).
20“Within our Russellian theory (as in Russell’s theory itself ), every formula that contains
descriptive terms is equivalent to a formula in which no descriptive term occurs, and T512
G7xFx↔ ∨y(∧ x(Fx↔ x = y)∧Gy)
is the guide to be employed in finding such a formula.” (Kalish, et. al., 1980, p. 405.) It is not,
however, the simple a guide one might guess it to be, since not every instance of T512 is a
theorem (pp. 398–9 and 404).
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granted that true sentences can differ in ‘sense’, and in the ‘thoughts’ or propo-
sitions they ‘have’ or that they express (though he does not insist on a distinc-
tion between meanings or senses of sentences, and thoughts they express). It
is only in what he likes to think of as their ‘extensions’ or ‘denotations’ that he
says the true ones are all alike in having for their extension or denotations The
True, and that the false ones are all alike in having for this The False.
Cf.: “Frege takes sentences as names (which is consistent with their
also being ‘vehicles for thoughts’), and adopts the compositionality
principle, according to which when a constituent name is replaced
by another having the same denotation, the denotation of the en-
tire name is not changed. Relying on these views, Frege claims
that all true sentences have the same denotation,  , and
all false sentences also have the same denotation,  .” (Lee
2002, p. 543.)
If sentences are cast as names, as it may be convenient to do for theories of ar-
tificial languages, and ‘extensional’ names are ‘compositional’ which seems nec-
essary, then it seems that sentences must name their truth–values. Cf.: “ ‘(w)hat
feature except the truth–value can be found that belongs to. . . sentences quite
generally and remains unchanged by substitutions (of co-referential parts)?’
(Frege 1960, pp. 64–5).”
5.2  ,  ,       (), 
  ()
Gödel’s slingshot purports to show that true sentences not only, qua names,
name their shared truth–value, but that they qua indicators all indicate or ex-
press the same truth or fact.21 That is contrary to Frege’s view of sentences
and their ‘thoughts’. How might he meet the contrary challenge of Gödel’s
slingshot? My guess is that he would not give up the idea that ‘closed’ definite
descriptions are names, and that he would agree that Russell’s Theory of De-
scriptions merely evades what he, Frege, might think of as the momentarily
puzzling conclusion of ‘Gödel’s Fregean argument’ (!) according to which there is
exactly one true proposition or fact. To prevent the collapse of all true propo-
sitions into a single one, Frege would, I think, rest with a rejection of the im-
plication of premise (i) that the thought or proposition expressed by a true sen-
tence, in so far as this thought or proposition depends on constituents of this
sentence that have denotations, “depends only on (their denotations). . . (not
on the manner in which this (denotation) is expressed)” (Gödel 1944, p. 128).
Rejecting that would allow him to say that the thought or proposition,
21Gödel does not, in his own slingshot, identify ‘facts’ with ‘true propositions’. He, for the
most part (an exception is in p. 129n7), leaves propositions out of his discussion, and confines
himself to ‘facts’ which he casts as the correlates of the ‘senses’, for Frege the thoughts or propo-
sitions, of true sentences.
Jordan Howard Sobel, “Collapsing Arguments”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 122–161
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008 146
that the University of Toronto is the largest university in Toronto,
is different from the thought or proposition,
that the University of Toronto is the oldest university in Toronto,
while accepting that ‘the largest university in Toronto’ and ‘the oldest univer-
sity in Toronto’ are names that denote the same thing. Frege could add posi-
tively that thoughts of sentences, in so far as they depend on constituents that
have denotations, depend on the senses of these constituents, and the manner
in which they present their denotations.
5.3 ’ 
The error, if I may say so, of Gödel’s slingshot, which was not ‘deep’. It was fa-
cilitated by his decision to run together the relation of names to objects they
‘denote’, and that of true sentences to the facts they, in Russell’s term, ‘indi-
cate’. He did this because he judged “that ‘denote’ and ‘indicate’ (in Russell’s
sense) together correspond to Frege’s ‘bedeuten”’ (Gödel 1944, p. 129), which,
Gödel tells us corresponds to ‘signify’ (p. 128n). But the relation of true sen-
tences to facts they ‘indicate’, and more generally of sentences to propositions
they ‘indicate’, is different from that of names to objects they ‘denote’ or name.
We have ‘names’ in English for propositions, for example, “[1] ‘Logicism’, (2)
‘the proposition that mathematics reduces to logic’, and [3] ‘that mathematics
reduces to logic”’ (King 2002, p. 341) are names of a single proposition. But
sentences are not names of propositions: for example, ‘Mathematics reduces to
logic.’ is a not a name of the proposition that mathematics reduces to logic,
but a sentence with which this proposition can be expressed. ‘Mathematics
reduces to logic is true’ is not ‘good English’; “Mathematics reduces to logic’
is true’ is ‘good philosophic English’ only in contexts for which predication of
truth to sentences has been explained.
I doubt that Russell ever thought of sentences as names. Frege knew that
in doing so he was exercising a kind of ‘license’. He wrote, “Let us for the mo-
ment assume that the sentence has a nominatum!” (Frege 1892 (1949), pp. 89–
90, exclamation mark original. The 1960 translation of (Frege 1892) does not
end this sentence with an exclamation mark.) Frege’s own argument was not a
‘collapsing argument’ with an ‘almost metaphysical, Eleatic conclusion’, but a
way of settling, for a theory that lets sentences have nominata, what the nomi-
nata of sentences must be, and then stipulating names for these nominata. The
nominata of sentences cannot be their thoughts or propositions. They must
be their conditions of truth and falsity. “For brevity I call. . . one the True, the
other the False” (Frege 1892 (1960), p. 63). Why not? No cause for alarm, or
excitement.22
22Cf.: “(W)ith Frege. . . we  all true sentences to denote. . . truth, and all false sen-
tences to denote. . . falsehood.” (Church 1958, p. 25.) Church writes that he postulates truth
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Gödel wrote, “I cannot help feeling that the problem raised by Frege’s puz-
zling conclusion has only been evaded by Russell’s theory of descriptions and
that there is something behind it which is not yet completely understood.”
(Gödel 1944, p. 130.) He was right about that in more ways than he suspected,
the first one of which is that what Gödel considered to be ‘Frege’s puzzling
conclusion’ was not a conclusion drawn by Frege, or one to which Frege was
committed. One may wonder, incidentally, why Gödel considered the con-
clusion of his own argument to tease Russell, that there is just one Truth or
Fact, and just one Falsehood, puzzling. There is evidence that at least in 1956
he was himself committed to the view that true propositions are all necessarily
equivalent: in a note toward an ‘ontological proof of the necessary existence of
God’ Gödel wrote that, given that a thing’s ‘essence’ is its ‘complete individual
property’, “ϕ(x) ⊃ Nϕ(x)” (Gödel 1995, p. 435).23 This together with his view
“that every proposition ‘speaks about something,’ i.e., can be brought to the
form ϕ(a)” (Gödel 1944, p. 129n), entails that, for any true sentences ϕ and
ψ, p(ϕ ↔ ψ))q is a true sentence, so that ϕ and ψ express necessarily equiv-
alent propositions. That is near enough to ‘the puzzling conclusion’ that true
sentences express the same proposition as to make hardly any difference.
6   
“The proof implicit in Gödel’s (1944) paper is certain to call to
mind a better known proof that appears explicitly in Church’s
(1943) review of Carnap’s (1942) book Introduction to Semantics24 Ver-
and falsehood, while noting that “Frege, as a thoroughgoing Platonic realist. . . would. . . say
that. . . there are two such things” (p. 25). I am on Frege’s side here.
23This may be compared to the threat to free will that Leibniz perhaps suspected was made
by his theory of ‘complete individual concepts’ for names of individuals that all truths about
individuals are ‘analytic’ and necessary. (Cf., Sobel 2004, Chapter , Appendix A).
24Church does not argue in (1943) that true sentences all designate the same proposition,
and he says nothing of facts in (1943). He does not run a ‘categorical collapsing argument’
of any kind. He offers only a ‘hypothetical collapsing argument’ against Carnap’s assumption
that “the designata of sentences are propositions” (Church 1943, p. 299). He writes that “it is
possible to prove that the designata of sentences. . . must be truth–values rather than proposi-
tions” (p. 299). Church explains how, by Carnap’s own principles for ‘synonymity’ in the sense of
‘co-designating’—the principles that “synonymous (co-designating) expressions are interchange-
able,” and that “L–equivalent sentences are synonymous (co-designating)”—if sentences desig-
nated propositions, any true sentences ϕ and ψ would designate the same proposition, even if
“one sentence is L–true and the other not,” whereas at least in that case propositions corre-
sponding to ϕ and ψ “are certainly not the same for any ordinary meaning of the word ‘propo-
sition”’ (p. 300). With Frege, Church says that sentences do not designate, but express, proposi-
tions.
Church implies that Carnap made trouble for himself by “allowing (in his semantical theory)
only one kind of meaning” (p. 302) and not, as Frege does, distinguishing the sense of a sentence
that determines the proposition it expresses, from the designatum of a sentence which, assuming
“common properties” for a language (p. 299), must be its truth–value. Gödel has this end note
to his paper: “I wish to express my thanks to Professor Alonzo Church. . . who helped me to find
the correct English expressions in a number of places.” (Gödel 1944, p. 153.) It is remarkable
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sions of Church’s proof have been deployed by Quine and David-
son to various philosophical ends, and discussed widely in the liter-
ature. By contrast, the literature contains relatively few discussions
of Gödel’s proof, which is interesting because Gödel’s premises are
weaker. . . The basic difference is that Church, Quine, and David-
son draw upon purported logical equivalences, such as. . . between. . . .
ϕ . . .a = (ιx)(x = a · ϕ) . . . (ιx)(x = a) = (ιx)(x = a · ϕ). The net
effect of this is that the Church–Quine–Davidson slingshot makes
use of a more contentious substitution principle.” 25 (Neale 1995,
p. 791; cf., 2001, pp. 166–7.)
6.1   ‘’ 
The argument of this section is addressed to ‘The Russellian Theory of De-
scriptions’ of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ) that “considers false any
subject–predicate sentence whose subject term is an improper definite descrip-
tion” (p. 395). In this theory definite descriptions are terms, and in interpreta-
tions improper descriptions all ‘designate’ some one thing that is “not in the
universe of the model” (p. 395). Let a ‘true sentence’ of The Russellian The-
ory under an interpretation for the language of this calculus, be a sentence
that under that interpretation expresses a true proposition. Understand ‘false
sentence’ of this calculus under an interpretation similarly. The coming David-
sonian argument for the conclusion that all true sentences of The Russellian
Theory under an interpretation express the same true proposition, and that
all ‘false sentences’ express the same false proposition, uses, in place of premise
that Gödel was not persuaded by Church not to use ‘signify’ as he does to cover both ‘denote’
or ‘designate’, and ‘express’ or ‘indicate’.
25It is, for several reasons, at best misleading to say that Gödelian slingshots use weaker
premises. First, though “Church, Quine, and Davidson draw upon purported logical equivalences”
(ibid.), they need not have. The Davidsonian argument coming ‘draws from logical equivalences’
only that, in The Russellian Theory of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ), for any sentence ϕ
and term A, p7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A ∧ ϕ)q express the same proposition (please see lines (g)
and (h) of the argument). The argument could have taken as premises these same–proposition
claims. The argument does not draw on the logical equivalence in The Russellian Theory of ϕ
and pA = 7α(α = A∧ϕ)q.
Second, Neale’s reconstruction of Gödel’s argument uses
G1 ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα).
My Gödelian slingshot uses Premise (iii)
ϕA is true→ ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα).
Premise (iii) is not a special case of “The Principle of Substituvity for Logical Equivalences () ”
(Neale 1995, p. 792, italics original). G1 is a special case of  for some interpretations of ‘T ’
(e.g., ‘the’, ‘!דּ’, and ‘7’), but not for all (it is not for ‘!ד’). Cf.: “Gödel produces a Slingshot whose
premises are quite different from—and  in some sense weaker than—those used by
Quine, Church, and Davidson.” (Oppy 1997, p. 127, small caps emphasis added.)
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(iii) addressed to The Russellian Theory, the principle that logically equivalent
–sentences express, under an interpretation, the same proposition—let this
principle be LE/SP. The argument does not need a premise to
the affect that, for every sentence, there is a ‘subject–predicate’ sentence that
expresses the same proposition. Reasoning to the first conjunct of the conclu-
sion can be as follows. For –sentences ϕ and ψ, and –name A that is not
a 7–description, we assume that,
(a) ϕ is true
(b) ψ is true
There are the following forms of theorems in ,
(c) ϕ↔ 7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ϕ), and
(d) ψ↔ 7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ψ).
(See proof in Figure 2.) It follows from (c) and (d) being forms of theorems that
(e) ϕ is logically equivalent to p7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ϕ)q, and
(f ) ψ is logically equivalent to p7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ψ)q
From these logical equivalences by LgEquv/SameProp, it follows that
(g) ϕ <expr> 7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ϕ)26
(h) ψ <expr> 7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ψ)
It follows from (a) and (b), and (c) and (d) that p7α(α = A ∧ ϕ)q and p7α(α =
A∧ψ)q are proper for the same thing,
(j) 7α(α = A∧ϕ) <expr> 7α(α = A∧ψ)
It follows from (j), by premise (i) of my Gödelian slingshot, that
(k) 7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ϕ) <expr> 7α(α = A) = 7α(α = A∧ψ)
26Cf., Neale’s G1:
ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα),
α a variable that is free in ϕα, A a term, and ϕA sentence that comes from ϕα by proper substi-
tution of A for α. The italicized difference explains how this Davidsonian argument is, without
aid of Gödel’s assumption that every sentence ‘means the same’ as some subject–predicate sen-
tence, general for all sentences.
Adapting a line from (Neale 1995, p. 793; cf., 2001, p. 171): “It will not do to object. . . that
(p7α(α = A ∧ ϕ)q in line (g)) is not well–formed or not interpretable unless ϕ contains an oc-
currence of α that (p7αq) can bind.” There is no such restriction on 7–terms in The Russellian
Theory of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ).
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All sentences of the forms (c) and (d) are instances of ‘(P ↔ 7x(x = A) =
7x(x = A∧P))’, which theorem has the following derivation in which neither
–1 nor –2 are used. As said in Section 4.3 above, all instances of the-
orems of this ‘Russellian calculus’ that have such derivations are themselves
theorems.
1.  P ↔ 7x(x = A) = 7x(x = A∧ P) (31,)
2.  P → 7x(x = A) = 7x(x = A∧ P) (19, )
3. P ()
4. A = 7x(x = A)↔ x(x = A↔ x = A) (7): Logic,
400, 
5.  x(x = A↔ x = A) (7, )
6.
7. x = A↔ x = A T91
8. A = 7x(x = A) 4, , 5,
9. A = 7x(x = A∧ P)↔ x(x = A∧ P ↔ x = A) (7): Logic,
400, 
10.  x(x = A∧ P ↔ x = A) (17, )
11.  x = A∧ P → x = A (13, )
12. x = A∧ P ()
13. x = A 12, S
14.  x = A→ x = A∧ P (16, )
15. x = A ()
16. x = A∧ P 3, 15,Adj
17. x = A∧ P ↔ x = A 11, 14, 
18. A = 7x(x = A∧ P) 9, , 10,
19. 7x(x = A) = 7x(x = A∧ P) 8, 18,T
20.  7x(x = A) = 7x(x = A∧ P)→ P (30, )
21. 7x(x = A) = 7x(x = A∧ P) ()
22.  x(x = A↔ x = A) (23, )





x(x = A↔ x = y) 22, 
25. yy = 7x(x = A)↔ ∨y∧ x(x = A↔ x = y) T500 : Logic,
p. 401; derived without aid of -1 or -2
26. yy = 7x(x = A) 25, , 24,






x(x = A∧ P ↔ x = y) T500, , 27,
29. x(x = A∧ P ↔ x = a) 28, 
30. P 29, , , Id,
31. P ↔ 7x(x = A) = 7x(x = A∧ P) 2, 20, 
Figure 2
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From (g), (h), and (k), it follows by premise (iii) (that <expr> is an equivalence
relation), that
(l) ϕ <expr> ψ.
For the second conjunct of the conclusion, we assume,
(m) ϕ is false
(n) ψ is false
It follows that
(o) p∼ϕq is true
(p) p∼ψq is true
It then follows as above that
(q) ∼ϕ<expr>∼ψ
from which it follows from (q), by premise (iii) and premise (i), that
(r) ∼∼ϕ<expr>∼∼ψ,
and from (r), by premise (v), that
(s) ϕ <expr> ψ.
The argument cannot be addressed to The Descriptions Calculus (Kalish, et.
al., 1980, Chapter ), since !ד–analogues of the schemata on (c)) and (d) are
not all theorems. (The sentence ‘P ↔ !דx(x = A) = !דx(x = A ∧ P)’ is false in
the model, U :{0, 1}; Improper designatum: 1; P : false; A : 1.) The argument can
be addressed to theories for denoting terms that feature an operator for class–
abstraction terms: λ–analogues of (c)) and (d) are theorems of such theories.27
6.2   
Neale presents an argument (1995, p. 793)28 from which can be gathered a
Davidsonian argument to show, without using anything like premise (v), that
sentences that have the same truth–value express the same proposition.
27Consider the sentence ‘P ↔ λx(x = A) = λx(x = A ∧ P)’. Suppose ‘P’ is true. Then,
necessarily, the terms ‘λx(x = A)’ and ‘λx(x = A ∧ P)’ both denote the singleton {A}, so that
‘λx(x = A) = λx(x = A∧ P)’ is also true, and the biconditional is true. Suppose ‘P’ is false, then
‘λx(x = A) = λx(x = A ∧ P)’ is also false, so that in this case too the biconditional is true. The
identity is false in this case since in it, while ‘λx(x = A)’ still denotes {A}, ‘λx(x = A∧P)’ denotes
the null–class {}.
28I believe it is the argument intended on (2001, p. 172). The argument actually produced on
that page is the same as the argument on the next page that is supposed to solve a problem for
it.
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6.2.1  
The following Davidsonian argument that I draw from (1995, p. 793) uses, in
addition to premises that can be gathered from annotations, the premise,
for any sentence χ that has a truth–value and term A that has a denotation
χ is logically equivalent to pTα(α = A) = Tα(α = A&χ)q
Let that be premise X. We assume, for argument, that
(1) ϕ and ψ have the same truth–value.
Now to show that ϕ and ψ express the same proposition.
(2) ϕ <expr> Tα(α = A) = Tα(α = A&ϕ).
premise X, LgEquv/SameProp
(3) Tα(α = A&ϕ) <expr> Tα(α = A&ψ). from (1)
(4) Tα(α = A) = Tα(α = A&ϕ) premise, 3, premise (i)
<expr> Tα(α = A) = Tα(α = A&ψ).
(5) ψ <expr> Tα(α = A) = Tα(α = A&ψ).
premise X, LgEquv/SameProp
(6) ϕ <expr> ψ. 3, 4, 5, premise (iii) (transitivity)
A somewhat leaner argument uses, instead of LgEquv/SameProp and premise X,
the premise—let it be premise (iii)*—that, for any sentence χ that has a truth–
value, and any term A that has a denotation,
χ <expr>pTα(α = A) = Tα(α = A&χ)q.
A less ambitious argument could proceed without LgEquv/SameProp
from premise X to the still startling conclusion that sentences that are mate-
rially equivalent are all logically equivalent. Inferences, in this argument, from
premise X would be to ‘demotions’ of (2) and (5) from statements of proposi-
tional identities, to statements of logical equivalences. The inference from (3)
would be to a similar demotion of (4).
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6.2.2        
 
While the specification of premise X to 7–descriptions of the ‘Russellian The-
ory’ is true, the inference from (1) to (3) is not valid for these descriptions (cf.:
Kalish, et. al., 1980; T504 on p. 402). It is the other way for the !ד–descriptions
of the Descriptions Calculus of (Kalish, et. al., 1980). While the inference
from (1) to (3) is valid for the !ד–descriptions (cf., Kalish, et. al., 1980; T404 on
p. 322), the specification of premise X to !ד–descriptions is false. “Frege (1893
(Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik)) suggests an alternative treatment according
to which an improper description refers to the class of entities satisfying its ma-
trix.” (1995, p. 797; 2001, p. 193): on this treatment, ‘Txx = 1’ refers to 1, ‘Tx(x
is 1 or 2)’ refers to {1, 2}, and ‘Tx(x is 1 and 2)’ refers to {}. The argument is
valid for this treatment: Premise X, specified for this treatment, is true. On this
treatment, if X is false, then, ‘Txx = A’ refers to A, ‘Tx(x = A&X)’ refers to
the null–class {}, and the identity sentence ‘Txx = A = Tx(x = A&X)’ is also
false; if X is true, then it is also true. And the inference from (1) to (3) is valid
on this treatment.
Neale says of the argument that I have mined for this Davidsonian argu-
ment, that it is valid if descriptions in it are given a non–term Russellian anal-
ysis (1995, p. 794). However, while an adaptation of premise X to !דּ–descriptions
(complete with scope–indicators) is true, the inference from (1) to an adapta-
tion of (3) to !דּ–descriptions is not valid: for example, if ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are both
false, then (1) is true of them; but the specification of (3) to these sentences
and a term ‘A’, ‘{!דּx(x = A∧P)}{ !דּx(x = A∧Q)} !דּx(x = A∧P) = !דּx(x = A∧Q),
is (doubly) false. This seems to be noticed and remedied in (2001) by a ‘cum-
bersome method’ due to Quine that results in an argument that is valid for !דּ–
descriptions (2001,p. 173). My current Davidsonian collapsing argument, sim-
ilarly encumbered, would have in place of ‘Tα(α = A& · χ)’ the necessarily
proper description ‘Tα((α = A&χ)∨ (α = B& ∼χ)). Encumbered it would be
(‘dressed out’ appropriately with scope–indicators) valid for !דּ–descriptions. It
would also valid for the !ד–descriptions of (Kalish, et. al., 1980, Chapter ), and
for those of the ‘alternative treatment of (Frege 1893)’; ‘for what these Fregean
theories are worth’, given that they (as all Fregean theories of descriptions as
terms that must have referents)29 are non-starters as accounts of the “treat-
ment of descriptions in natural language” (2001, p. 194).30
29Strawsonian theories treat definite descriptions as terms that, when improper, lack refer-
ences. A good one would be worth something. Though, if it ‘had no use for scope–indicators’,
it would not be a fully adequate account of ‘descriptions in natural language’. Some of Neale’s
‘counter–examples’ to Strawsonian theories as “account(s) of descriptions in natural language”
might be parried by a Strawsonian theory that could differentiate possible scopes of definite de-
scriptions, and say that whether an improper descriptions “renders the proposition false. . . (or)
prevents a proposition from being expressed. . . (did) turn on structural or logical facts about the
sentence used” (1995, pp. 802–3; 2001, pp. 199-201).
30According to this ‘alternative treatment’, the author of (Kalish, et. al., 1980) is the class
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The inference from (1) to (3) in my unencumbered Davidsonian argument
is, as it happens, valid for the class–abstractions of Church’s argument: for ex-
ample, if ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are true, then ‘λx(x = A ∧ P)’ and ‘λx(x = A ∧ Q)’ both
denote {A}; and if ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are false, these λ–terms denote {}. Furthermore,
premise X is true for λ–terms. These terms—these ‘specialized definite descrip-
tions’31—have, for this Davidsonian collapsing argument, one advantage or an-
other over the descriptive terms of The Description Calculus and The Russel-
lian Theory of Descriptions of (Kalish, et. al., 1980), and an advantage over the
non–term !דּ–descriptions of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions.
6.3 ’  
Davidson does not argue in (1969) for a conclusion concerning sentences and
propositions. He argues against the utility of facts for a theory that would
explain truth. He argues that we are unlikely to “find (a) way to pick out facts”
that, (i), does not “distinguish facts as finely as statements,” and, (ii), does not,
for any sentencesϕ andψ, identify the fact denoted by pthe fact thatϕq with the
fact denoted by pthe fact that ψq when either ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent,
or ϕ and ψ differ from one another only “in that a singular term (in ϕ ) has
been replaced by a coextensive singular term,” for if this distjunctive identity–
condition holds for facts, then there are not several facts, but only a single
Great Fact. (Davidson 1969, pp. 752–3.) Davidson says that “we cannot hope
to explain truth by appeal to (facts)” (p. 753), unless we can find a way between
these extremes of a one–to–one correspondence of true statements and facts,
and a many–one relation. He thinks there is no middle way, and that “(t)alk
about facts reduces to predication of truth” (ibid.). His argument against facts
of use in a ‘theory of truth’ is ‘guardedly categorical’.
Davidson’s ‘statements’ are, I think, my ‘propositions’. Since I identify
facts with true propositions, I distinguish them exactly as finely as proposi-
tions. Furthermore I agree that “we cannot hope to explain truth (of proposi-
tions) by appeal to (facts)” (ibid.),32 and I do ‘reduce’ classifications of proposi-
tions as facts, and predications of truth to propositions, one to the other.
{Donald Kalish, Richard Montague, Gary Mar}, and the author of (Kalish and Montague, 1964)
is a proper sub–class of it.
31A literal translation of ‘λxFx’ can be ‘the class such that an object x is a member of this class
if and only if Fx’. In a first order theory for classes that features logical predicates ‘κ’ and ‘ε ′ for
‘A is a class’ and ‘A is an element of b’, the λ–operator could be defined thus: for variables α and
β and formula ϕ,
λαϕ = !דα(κα∧ β(βεα↔ ϕ)).
32I agree with this, though not because I distinguish facts exactly as finely as true proposi-
tions, but because I identify them with true propositions. Actual ‘states of things’, named not
by ‘that’–clauses but by gerundives such as ‘snow’s being white’, provided they are distinguished
exactly as finely as are true propositions, and correspond to them one–to–one, are I think ‘what
in the world make propositions true’. I do not understand why Davidson thought that an ex-
planation of truth in terms of ‘facts’ would need not to distinguish facts exactly as finely as true
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Davidson does not suggest that the plurality of true statements is threat-
ened, or that there is a single Great Truth. He says that “there are very strong
reasons, as Frege pointed out, for supposing that if sentences, when standing
alone or in truth–functional contexts, name anything, then all true sentences
name the same thing” (1969, p. 750). He does not say that there any reasons, let
alone strong ones, for supposing that sentences name statements, that in par-
ticular, a sentence ϕ not only expresses the proposition named by pthe statement
that ϕq, but names it.
7   ,  ’ λ–
7.1        
– 
The Davidsonian ‘categorical’ collapsing argument’ of Section 6.1 for the con-
clusion that sentences of ‘The Russellian Theory of Descriptions’ of (Kalish,
et. al., 1980, Chapter ) that are true under an interpretation all express
under it the same true proposition, and that ‘false sentences’ express a single
false proposition, uses premise (i). These arguments suffer thereby for a reason
developed in Section 5.2: premise (i) is untenable for languages in which definite
descriptions are terms (and indeed, Section 4.1, not only for languages in which
they are not terms). Related ‘non-categorical’ arguments of some philosophic
interest do not have this problem, for they would be reductios of ‘theories’ of
propositions that include the objectionable principles of premise (i).
Church runs against Carnap’s theory of propositions as designata of sen-
tences a non-categorical argument that takes ideas from Frege’s identification
of truth–values as the denotations of sentences. Monty Furth pummelled me
with something like this argument at .... one day in 1964 when I con-
fessed affection for propositions. He pressed the issue of when propositions
are the same, and when they are different; and I suggested, for openers, that
propositions expressed by ‘subject–predicate’ English sentences that ‘say the
same thing about the same thing’ are identical. That condition is, in ‘mate-
rial mode’, part of premise (i) of the slingshot in Section 1. He ‘called time’
to get notes from his office that he had taken at recent lectures given by
Church. With these in hand, Monty made an argument to show that the the-
ory I had floated would have true ‘subject–predicate’ sentences expressing the
same proposition, assuming that logically equivalent proposition express the
same proposition (otherwise they express logically equivalent propositions),
and similarly for false ‘subject–predicate’ proposition. The argument of Sec-
tion 6.1 above can be adapted to make his point. For this adaptation, assume
statements, unless, after all, his statements were sentences nor propositions. Propositions, the
primary bearers of truth–values, are presumably not distinguished exactly as finely as sentences.
They are not. if it is sometimes possible, when we say something, to say not merely something
logically equivalent, but the very same thing, in other words.
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that ‘ϕ ′ and ‘ψ’ symbolize ‘subject–predicate’ sentences. The inference to (k)
by premise (i), is in this adaptation by the propositional–identity condition that
I floated that day. The identity on line (j) entails that the propositions ex-
pressed by the sentences on line (k) ‘say the same thing about the same thing’
albeit under different names for it: each says of the same thing, 7α(a = A∧ϕ)
or 7α(α = A∧ϕ), that it is 7α(α = A), the thing that is A.
7.2     –
Monty’s argument actually ran in terms not of generic definite descriptions
but specifically of the class–abstractions Church had used in his criticism of
Carnap’s theory of propositions as designata of sentences. Neale says it is
“(a) superficial difference between the arguments of Church and Gödel. . . that
Church uses the abstraction operator ‘(λx)’—where ‘(λx)ϕ’ is read as ‘the class
of all x such that ϕ’—while Gödel (implicitly) uses the definite description op-
erator ‘( !דx)’.” (1995, pp. 791–2n30; 2001, p. 166.) English ‘class–abstractions’ are
evidently definite descriptions of a particular form, and they share with defi-
nite descriptions of all forms the possibility of impropriety. Though the general
run of English class–abstractions are necessarily proper descriptions, thanks
to the availability of the null–class as the class that is uniquely described;33
that Mars has a moon. And it is necessary that the proposition that Mars has
a moon is either true or false. there are a few ‘anomalous’ (‘aberrant’, ‘para-
doxical’) class–abstractions in currency that are improper: for example, ‘the
class of classes that are not members of themselves’ is a necessarily improper
‘class–abstraction’; it is demonstrable that there is no such class.34 Still, while
the differences between the arguments of Church and Gödel are in a limited
sense superficial, they are, contrary to Neale, not without dialectical signifi-
33Assume that ‘A’ abbreviates ‘1’ and ‘P’ abbreviates ‘Mars has a moon’. Then ‘λx(x = A∧ P)’
is necessarily proper. It is well–formed, and by the rule for evaluating λ–terms, it is proper for
the unit–class {1} if it is true that Mars has a moon, and for the null–class {} if it is false.
34While improper definite descriptions are ubiquitous in ordinary discourse, and it is often
not ‘analytically necessary’ that they are improper (consider ‘the author of Principia Mathemat-
ica’), ‘improper class–abstractions’ are rare in ordinary discourse, and it seems that, of improper
class–abstractions, it is always ‘analytically necessary’ that they are improper (that is, ‘that there
is no such class’). As a consequence, class–abstractions in ordinary discourse almost always
‘behave logically as terms’, as do all proper definite descriptions, and so can be safely treated
as terms. Related, one assumes, to this non–superficial difference between definite descrip-
tions in general, and class–abstractions in particular, is that while the best known, and most
often adopted, treatment of definite descriptions in general is Russell’s Theory of Descriptions
in which they are pseudo terms, there are few formal treatments of class–abstractions as other
than terms in languages in which would–be paradoxical class–abstractions are not well–formed
(“(t)his or some other departure from the informal notion (being) necessary. . . —in the presence
of. . . assumptions it is difficult to avoid—(on pain otherwise of ). . . antinomies” (Church 1958,
p. 29)). Neale cites only Quine and Smullyan for treatments of class–abstractions that make
them not terms, but pseudo terms defined by, or in a similar manner to, Russellian descriptions:
“In Smullyan’s (1948). . . ‘((λx)Fx)’ is a scope marker just like Whitehead and Russell’s ‘(( !דx)Fx)”’
(Neale 1995, p. 792n32; 2001, p. 167).
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cance.35 Contrary to Neale, it makes a difference whether collapsing arguments
are run in terms of definite descriptions or class–abstractions. For one thing,
Church’s argument for Gödel’s ‘nearly Eleatic’ conclusions regarding all true,
and all false sentences, does not “to be of any interest whatsoever (need to) be
supplemented with a precise semantics for (class–abstractions)” (Neale 1995,
p. 794). There is not a multiplicity of alternative semantics for treatments of
class–abstractions as terms in currency, some of which serve all purposes of
this argument, and some of which do not. For other things: Church’s class–
abstraction argument is simpler than Gödel’s definite–description argument;
Church’s argument does not address first only ‘subject–predicate’ sentences,
and from conclusions for them proceed to all sentences. It deals at once with
all true sentences and false ones. And Church’s class–abstraction–argument is
in several ways ‘leaner’ than Gödel’s definite–description argument.
As I construct Gödel’s argument in Sections 1 and 2 above, and would con-
struct Church’s argument along lines drawn in Section 6.2.1 above, their ar-
guments are in two ways alike, and in one way different without either being
‘leaner’ for the difference. They are alike in what they draw from premise (i)
of Section 1 above. Each needs only that substitutions of terms for identicals
in extensional positions in identity–sentences proceed not only salva veritate
(which they do by definition of ‘extensional positions’), but also salva pronuntia-
tio. Also, this is premise (iv), each depends on, the relation signified by ‘<expr>’,
the relation of having the same denotation or expressing the same proposition,
being an equivalence relation. These arguments differ when it comes to premise
(iii) of Gödel’s argument,
if ϕA is true, then
ϕA <expr> A = Tα(α = A&ϕα)
is true,
A a term in which no variable is free, α a variable that is free in formulaϕα, and
ϕA a sentence that comes fromϕα by proper substitution ofA for α. A related
principle, sufficient for my construction of Church’s argument, is premise (iii)**,
ϕ <expr> λα(α = A) = λα(α = A∧ϕ)
ϕ a sentence that express a proposition, A a closed term that has a denota-
tion. However, these different premises are logically independent: Neither
argument is ‘leaner’ for this difference between them.36
35Neale writes that “Church is fully aware that it makes no difference whether descriptions
or class abstracts are used in setting up the slingshot.” (Neale 1995, p. 792n; 2001, p. 167.)
36However, while premise (iii) is not, when specified for it, a theorem of every theorem
of descriptions; premise (iii)**, when specified for it, is a theorem of every theory of class–
abstractions—it is a theorem of theories that casts them as terms, and, ‘dressed out’ appro-
priately with scope–indicators, of theories that cast them as specialized Russellian descriptions.
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Now come three ways in which Church’s argument is ‘leaner’ for its dif-
ferences from Gödel’s. First, while Gödel’s argument assumes, this is premise
(ii), that all definite descriptions are terms, Church’s argument assumes only
that definite descriptions that are class–abstractions are terms. Second, Church’s
argument, in contrast with my construction of Gödel’s, does not use, for the
conclusion that all false sentences express the same proposition, anything like
premise (v) according to which, for any sentence ϕ, ϕ <expr>p∼∼ϕq: it deals at
once both with true, and with false sentences. Third, Church’s argument, to
reach Gödel’s ‘nearly Eleatic’ conclusions not only for ‘subject–predicate’ sen-
tences, but for all sentences, uses nothing like Gödel’s ‘further assumption (2)’
that every sentence ‘means the same thing as some subject–predicate sentence’:
with premise (iii)** Church’s argument deals at once with all sentences. This is
the most important way in which my construction Church’s argument would
be not only simpler, but ‘leaner’, than my construction of Gödel’s argument.
8 
Probably collapsing arguments that work with descriptive terms have recom-
mended themselves to Neale as objects to study, because of his general interest
in definite descriptions, and his opposition to Fregean theories that cast them
as terms that must refer, which interest and opposition I share. He comments
very briefly on the possibility of ‘abstraction slingshots’ in order to say why he
will examine only ‘description slingshots’ (Neale 1995, p. 791–2n; 2001, pp. 166–
7).37 But if one is concerned to oppose collapsing arguments, as best one can,
then paying at least equal attention to arguments such as Church’s that run in
terms of class–abstractions is recommended, for this attention can facilitate
identifying the bad compound idea that is common to economical collapsing ar-
guments of both descriptive–term and class–abstraction–terms technologies.
It is the tripartite idea that: for one thing, if not all definite descriptions, then
at least those that are class–abstractions, are terms; for a second thing, sentences
that differ only in co-extensive terms express the same propositions; and, for a
third thing, something like premise (iii)** above is true.
‘The culprit’ is this combination of ideas. However, ‘shame of place’ should, I
think, go to the second of them. Assuming the abbreviations—A: the number
one;M: Mars has at most two moons; and S: Saturn has at least three moons—
the as it happens true identity,
λx(x = A∧M) = λx(x = A∧ S),
37In (1995) Neale explains his concentration on ‘description slingshots’ thus: “it makes no
difference whether descriptions or class abstracts are used in setting up the slingshot. . . For the
sake of continuity, I will stick to statements that contain descriptions.” (p. 792n30) In (2001)
he writes: “it makes no difference whether descriptions or class abstracts are used in setting up
the basic slingshot. For epistemological reasons I have a preference for (first order definable)
description over abstraction, so I will examine only versions that make use of descriptions.”
(p. 167)
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without a doubt entails that the propositions expressed by ‘λx(x = A) = λx(x =
A ∧M)’ and ‘λx(x = A) = λx(x = A ∧ S)’ have the same truth–value and are
materially equivalent. But the suggestion that the displayed identity entails
that these propositions are not only materially, but logically, equivalent, let alone
the suggestion that they are identical, is, if I may say so, ridiculous.38 There
is nothing going for this part of premise (i) for anyone who makes use in his
philosophy of ‘proposition’.
Another example to this point can be reached from discussion in (Lee
2002) of a case involving descriptions such as ‘ !דx(x = Socrates ∧x is an Athe-
nian)’ and ‘λx(x = Socrates∧ Socrates is an Athenian not a Spartan)’. Switching
to class–abstractions, and ‘losing’ the third occurrences of ‘x’, we have that the
identity–proposition that
λx(x = Socrates ∧ Socrates is mortal) = λx(x = Socrates ∧ Socrates is an
Athenian not a Spartan),
entails that the propositions that
λx(x = Socrates) = λx(x = Socrates ∧ Socrates is mortal),
and that
λx(x = Socrates) = λx(x = Socrates ∧ Socrates is an Athenian not a Spartan)
are materially equivalent. It is given that Socrates is mortal, and that he is an
Athenian, not a Spartan, so these propositions are both true, as is the identity–
premise from which their material equivalence follows. However, “in a world in
which Socrates is (mortal) and yet a Spartan (not an Athenian)” (p. 547, italics added),
though the proposition that
λx(x = Socrates) = λx(x = Socrates ∧ Socrates is mortal)
is true, since {Socrates} = {Socrates}, the proposition that
λx(x = Socrates) = λx(x = Socrates ∧ Socrates is an Athenian not a Spartan)
is false, since {Socrates} 6= {}. In such a world these propositions are not mate-
rially equivalent. They are thus not logically equivalent, let alone identical.
38Oppy sees Gödel’s particular slingshot, addressed as it was to Russell’s philosophical/logical
situation, as founded on a compound error. Cf.: “I think that it is pretty obvious that anyone
who treats facts as structured entities (as Russell did) will resist the suggestion that ‘Fa’ and
‘a = the x : x = a& Fx’ express the same fact (so that Russell’s escape from the slingshot
argument is overdetermined: it isn’t just his analysis of descriptions that sets him free).” (e-
mail, 27 January 2004.) To complicate we should recall that Russell’s first resistance to that
suggestion would go to the incompleteness of ‘A = !דx(x = A& Fx)’ which he would see as short for
‘{ !דx(x = A& Fx)}A = !דx(x = A& Fx)’. Also while he would resist the identity of the propositions
expressed by this sentence and ‘FA’, he would see that they are logically equivalent, and that
therefore it is not a sufficient answer on his part to Gödel’s slingshot that it claims identity for
these propositions. The logical equivalence of all truths, and of all falsehoods, would be collapse
enough.
Jordan Howard Sobel, “Collapsing Arguments”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 122–161
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008 160

[1]   (1946), “Review of Gödel’s ‘Russell Mathematical Logic,”
Journal of Symbolic Logic 11, pp. 75–9.
[2]   (1998), “From Meaning and Necessity,” in Definite Descrip-
tions: A Reader, ed. . , Cambridge, Mass.:  Press, pp. 123–33.
(First published in 1947.)
[3]   (1997), “On Singular Propositions,” in, Meaning
and Reference, edited by  . , Canadian Journal of Philosophy Sup-
plementary Volume 23.
[4]   (1958), Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Volume ,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. (Volume  is, alas, no
longer forthcoming.)
[5]   (1969), “True to the Facts,” The Journal of Philosophy 66,
pp. 748–764.
[6]   (1960), “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für
Philosophie under Kritik, vol. 100 (1892), pp. 25–50. (“On Sense and Deno-
tation,” Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege, edited
by  and , Oxford, 1960, pp. 56–78. “On Sense and Nomina-
tum,” is in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by  and ,
Appleton–Century–Crofts, New York, 1949, pp. 85–102.)
[7]   (1964), The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the Sys-
tem, translated and edited with an introduction by  ,
Los Angeles: University of California Press.
[8]   (1944), “Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” in The Philosophy of
Bertrand Russell, edited by . . , Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, pp. 123–53.
[9]   (1995), Selected Works, Volume  Unpublished Essays and
Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[10]   and   (1980), Logic: Techniques of For-
mal Reasoning, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
[11]  ,  , and   (1980), Logic:
Techniques of Formal Reasoning, Second Edition, New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
[12]  .  (2002), “Designating Propositions,” The Philosophical Re-
view 111, pp. 341–71.
Jordan Howard Sobel, “Collapsing Arguments”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 122–161
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008 161
[13]  .  (2002), “Davidson’s Slingshot Argument Revisited,” Dia-
logue , pp. 541–50.
[14]   (1995), “The Philosophical Significance of Gödel’s Sling-
shot,” Mind 104, pp. 761–825.
[15]   and   (1997), “Slingshots and Boomerangs,”
Mind 106, pp. 143–168.
[16]   (1998), “Grammatical Form, Logical Form, and Incom-
plete Symbols,” Definite Descriptions: A Reader, edited by  ,
Cambridge, Mass.:  Press
[17]   (2001), Facing Facts, Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press.
[18]   (1997), “The Philosophical Insignificance of Gödel’s Sling-
shot,” Mind 106, pp. 121–41.
[19]   (2004), “Facing Facts?” Australian Journal of Philosophy,
forthcoming.
[20]   (2004), “One Way to Face Facts,” The Philosophical Quar-
terly 54, pp. 420–6.
[21]   - (1998), “Searle’s Correspondence The-
ory of Truth and the Slingshot,” Philosophical Quarterly 48, pp. 513–22.
[22]   (1948), “Modality and Description,” Journal of Symbolic
Logic 13, pp. 139–41.
[23]    (2004), Logic and Theism: Arguments For and
Against Beliefs in God, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
[24]    (2006a), Words and Symbols, Proofs and Invali-
dations: to Complement and Supplement Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning,”
linked to http://www.scar.utoronto.ca/~sobel/.
[25]   (2006b), “‘Paradox, Heal Thyself!’,” linked to
http://www.scar.utoronto.ca/~sobel/.
[26]    (2006c), “On Nearly Believable Liars,” linked to
http://www.scar.utoronto.ca/~sobel/.
Jordan Howard Sobel, “Collapsing Arguments”, Australasian Journal of Logic (6) 2008, 122–161
The Australasian Journal of Logic ( 1448-5052) disseminates articles that signifi-
cantly advance the study of logic, in its mathematical, philosophical or computational
guises. The scope of the journal includes all areas of logic, both pure and applied to
topics in philosophy, mathematics, computation, linguistics and the other sciences.
Articles appearing in the journal have been carefully and critically refereed under the
responsibility of members of the Editorial Board. Only papers judged to be both sig-
nificant and excellent are accepted for publication.
The journal is freely available at the journal website at
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/.
All issues of the journal are archived electronically at the journal website.
 Individuals may subscribe to the journal by sending an email, in-
cluding a full name, an institutional affiliation and an email address to the managing ed-
itor at ajl-editors@unimelb.edu.au. Subscribers will receive email abstracts of accepted
papers to an address of their choice. For institutional subscription, please email the
managing editor at ajl-editors@unimelb.edu.au.
Complete published papers may be downloaded at the journal’s website at http:
//www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/. The journal currently publishes in pdf
format.
 The journal accepts submissions of papers electronically. To submit
an article for publication, send the LATEX source of a submission to a member of the
editorial board. For a current list of the editorial board, consult the website.
The copyright of each article remains with the author or authors of that article.
